Shortly after this incident Commodore Sloat was allowed to return "by
reason of ill health," as has been heretofore published in most
histories. His undoubted recall gave room to Commodore Robert Stockton,
to whom Sloat not only turned over the command of the naval forces, but
whom he also directed to "assume command of the forces and operations on
shore."
Stockton at once invited Fremont to enlist under his command, and the
invitation was accepted. The entire forces moved south by sea and land
for the purpose of subduing southern California. This end was
temporarily accomplished with almost ridiculous ease. At this distance
of time, allowing all obvious explanations of lack of training, meager
equipment, and internal dissension, we find it a little difficult to
understand why the Californians did not make a better stand. Most of
the so-called battles were a sort of _opera bouffe_. Californians
entrenched with cannon were driven contemptuously forth, without
casualties, by a very few men. For example, a lieutenant and nine men
were sufficient to hold Santa Barbara in subjection. Indeed, the
conquest was too easy, for, lulled into false security, Stockton
departed, leaving as he supposed sufficient men to hold the country. The
Californians managed to get some coherence into their councils, attacked
the Americans, and drove them forth from their garrisons.
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