Our position in the region of the Dukla Pass early last month exposed us
to pressure from two sides, and might have involved the necessity of
evacuating the main range. Our army thus required to extend its
positions commanding the outlets to the Hungarian plain, before the
Spring thaws, in face of a large hostile concentration between Lupkow
and Uzsok. The chief attack was directed against the latter section, and
an auxiliary attack against the Bartfeld-Lupkow section. The auxiliary
attack began on March 19 against the Austro-German left flank and
reached its full development four days later. Mistaking the auxiliary
for the principal attack, the enemy began an advance from the Bukowina,
hoping to divert us from Uzsok, but, instead, the larger portion of our
army assailed the enemy's flanks while a smaller body advanced against
Rostoki, surmounting the immense difficulties of mountain warfare in
Springtime.
By means of the envelopment of both his flanks the enemy was, by April
5, dislodged from the main range on the entire seventy-mile front from
Regetow to Wolosate. Convinced that we were directing our chief efforts
against his flanks, the enemy now strove to break our resistance in the
Rostoki direction, but, after sixteen futile attacks, he was obliged to
cede the commanding height of Telepovce, our occupation of which will
probably compel him to evacuate his positions at Polen and Smolnik and
withdraw to the valley of the Cziroka, a tributary of the Laborez.
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