The sinking of this
ship, with the delicate diplomatic situation between Germany and the
United States which the act brought about, is not a military or naval
operation as such, and comments on it have no place in this column. At
the same time there is an indirect effect of the drowning of hundreds of
British citizens which will have a very direct bearing on Britain's
military strength and policy.
The British public is notably hard to stir, are slow to act, and almost
always underrate their adversary. In almost every war, from 1775 down to
and including the South African war, England, with a self-assurance that
could only be based on ignorance of true conditions, has started with
only a small force, and it has been only when this force has been
defeated and used up that the realization of the true needs of the
situation has dawned. Then, and then only, has recruiting been possible
at a pace commensurate with the necessity.
In the Boer war, for example, every one in England, official and
civilian, believed that 30,000 men would be more than enough to defeat
the South African burghers. Yet ten times 30,000 British soldiers were
operating in the Transvaal and Orange Free State before the war ended.
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