' JOHNSON. 'You are surer that you are free, than you are
of prescience; you are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as
you please, than you are of any conclusion from a deduction of
reasoning. But let us consider a little the objection from prescience.
It is certain I am either to go home to-night or not; that does not
prevent my freedom.' BOSWELL. 'That it is certain you are _either_ to go
home or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of
choice between the two is compatible with that certainty. But if _one_
of these events be certain _now_, you have no _future_ power of
volition. If it be certain you are to go home to-night, you _must_ go
home.' JOHNSON. 'If I am well acquainted with a man, I can judge with
great probability how he will act in any case, without his being
restrained by my judging. GOD may have this probability increased to
certainty.' BOSWELL. 'When it is increased to _certainty_, freedom
ceases, because that cannot be certainly foreknown, which is not certain
at the time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a contradiction in
terms to maintain that there can be afterwards any _contingency_
dependent upon the exercise of will or any thing else.
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