Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At
the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing,
and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of
the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression
that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally,
it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large
number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of
Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat.
This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present
position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German
mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory,
were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that
victory failed to be gained.
INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY.
From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction
of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the
counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had
made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her
regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage
which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save
themselves.
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